



# Government of Liberia Plan for UNMIL Transition March 2015 to 30 June 2016

Preparing to Assume Full Security Responsibility from UNMIL

**REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA**

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## Preparing to Assume Full Security Responsibility from UNMIL

### **1. Context**

After fourteen years of war, the Liberian stakeholders signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, Ghana on 18 August 2003. The agreement changed the political environment in the country: it brought to an end years of violence, ushered in a transitional political arrangement and the elections of 2005 that brought the administration of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to power. It also led to the establishment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) through resolution 1509 (2003) with a mandate, among other elements, to support the reform of the security sector, specifically the police. Since then, UNMIL has provided support to the Government of Liberia in its SSR efforts, and ultimately in the maintenance of peace, justice and security.

Over a decade later, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2190 on 15 December 2014, in which it called on the Liberian Government to ‘assume fully its complete security responsibilities from UNMIL no later than 30 June 2016’. It also stressed that the Government of Liberia should craft a ‘concrete plan, with timelines and benchmarks, for building the security sector in coordination with the reconfiguration of UNMIL, detailing leadership, coordination, monitoring and resources, oversight mechanisms, early passage of the draft Police Act and further reform of the promotion and manpower policies, with the view to decentralizing the national security institutions, particularly the LNP’. The resolution urges the Government to make efforts towards reforming the security and justice sectors in order to provide protection to all Liberians.

### **2. Methodology**

This plan emerges out of three inter-related processes, namely, a review of existing plans and strategies and recommendations from previous Government initiated reviews and national consultative discussions, including the 2013 National Security Sector Reform Retreat, the 2013 Criminal Justice Conference and Management and Accountability Review; a broader consultative process involving the various security agencies as well as heads of units in UNMIL that work on both security and justice sector issues; consultations with other branches of government and stakeholders; and retreats convened in early 2015 by the security agencies at which institutional priorities were identified. The technical team that was tasked with supporting the development of this plan under the guidance of the Minister of Justice comprised representatives from both the Government and UNMIL. The outcome is consistent with the plan for SSR as envisaged under the Agenda for Transformation (AfT) and the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Liberia (NSSRL).

### **3. Underlying Principles**

Over the years, the reform of the security sector has been driven by principles enshrined in both the NSSRL and the AfT. Importantly, both documents lay the basis for the future of the security sector. For example, the NSSRL calls for a shift in security thinking and practices from a narrow regime-centered and militaristic notion of security to human-centered security. It also places emphasis on efficiency, transparency, accountability, democratic and civilian oversight as guiding principles of the security sector. The strategy also stresses respect for rule of law and human rights as vital ingredients for the building of a peaceful and stable society. Further, the AfT stresses the link between security and socio-economic growth and development. Hence, it does not only recognize the challenges facing the sector but also sets the strategic objectives for achieving them and underlines the critical need to ‘improve sustained operational effectiveness, including enhanced coordination, and reduce corruption in the Liberian security agencies’. It also reinforces the need to ‘increase public confidence in oversight, accountability, professionalization and legitimacy of the security sector’. All of these elements are incorporated in this plan and are developed more fully in part 5 of this plan (below).

This plan recognises the importance and relevance of other national priorities that are essential for the promotion of peace and stability in Liberia. Thus, it does not seek to replace the existing strategies but fully complement them by prioritizing and focusing on the broader security concerns that are indissolubly and inextricably linked not only to the departure of UNMIL and the security challenges and gaps that are associated with it, but to the overall task of effectively and efficiently maintaining security, peace and access to justice in post-war Liberia. In this light, it constitutes a living document.

Given the complex, trans-border and transnational nature of contemporary security challenges, this plan envisages a ‘joined-up’ or ‘whole-of-government’ security approach as the way forward. This point is reinforced in the NSSRL, which stresses that because national security threats can be ‘non-military’, non-military institutions ‘shall, from time to time, have an important role to play in promoting Liberia’s national security interests and values’. The NSSRL further emphasizes that responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Liberia is a joint one, by stating that “the achievement of the national security goals of Liberia will not only rest upon the shoulders of those institutions that provide physical and military security, but also upon those which are non-military in nature but without whom there can be no national stability, peace and security.”

In addition, there is also the need for a regional approach because of the indivisibility of security: insecurity anywhere in the region constitutes the basis for insecurity in another country. Recognizing the importance of this, UN Security Council Resolution 2190 encourages the Liberian Government to strengthen security cooperation in the Mano River Union (MRU) sub region. The joint border security committees between Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire and the 15<sup>th</sup> Protocol of the MRU do provide the institutional and normative frameworks respectively for such cooperation.

Finally, it is urged that the activities envisaged under this plan should be gender sensitive. In particular this should be reflected in areas such as capacity development, policymaking, security legislation, leadership, recruitment and promotion. The specific role of women in the security sector should be in consonance with UNSCR 1325

and other guiding documents. Similarly, the issue of human rights is mainstreamed and captured under the activities of the various security agencies both implicitly and explicitly.

#### **4. Threat assessment**

Liberia is faced with local, national, regional and global security concerns that require close attention. Some of these have been adequately captured in the NSSRL. Locally and nationally, existing land disputes and ethnic divisions, together with pervasive poverty, especially among the youth, as well as the legacies of civil war make Liberia vulnerable to internal conflicts. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, is a major security concern that should be addressed with urgency. While the recent allegations of electoral fraud in the 2014 mid-term senatorial elections have been addressed through the National Election Commission (NEC) and the courts (and the reliance on the legal course instead of violence must be celebrated) the Government and people of Liberia are fully aware that the prospect of electoral violence in the future remains real. In order to avoid this, the National Elections Commission (NEC) should take the appropriate measures to avoid major electoral irregularities in future elections and all political parties bear the primary responsibility to ensure adherence to the law. The issue of elections and electoral violence constitute an integral element of the country's national security challenges; it could undermine state legitimacy.

As the recent EVD crisis has demonstrated that Liberia is extremely vulnerable to unforeseen disasters and emergencies. Limited healthcare and disaster response capacities make Liberia susceptible to a range of broader security challenges. As recent experience has shown, the outbreak of the Ebola virus has had a serious national security implication; it partly delayed the implementation of plans by some of the security institutions. Renewed Ebola outbreaks could yet present a danger since the virus has the potential to remain dormant in hospitable natural reservoirs even after the containment of the current outbreak. The limited ability of the Fire Service to respond to major fires could make Liberia vulnerable to both large urban and bush fires, especially in the dry season. While tectonically stable Liberia could still be vulnerable to a Tsunami, especially from seismic activity in the Canary Islands. Given the potentially unforeseeable nature of these threats Liberia needs to establish a natural disaster and emergency management capacity. While a *Natural Disaster Management Act* is currently being piloted through the Legislature by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is essential that the National Security Council establishes a disaster management system which integrates the security sector with other response ministries.

Currently, Liberia enjoys good and amicable relations with its immediate neighbors, and the relative regional stability within the MRU means that it is unlikely that it will face a major conventional military threat in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the fact that security is indivisible means that instability elsewhere in the region could also result in security threats within Liberia. For example, *Operation Restore Hope I and II* in 2012/13 saw the deployment of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberia National Police (LNP) along the border with Cote d'Ivoire to stop insurgents from using Liberian territory to carry out attacks across the border and to ensure that tensions in that country did not spill over into Liberia.

Further, Liberia could also become vulnerable to a number of threats from both terrorism and transnational organized crime. The West Africa region is increasingly being used as an illicit drug transshipment point from Latin America and Asia to major western states. This brings with it the threat of drug cartel-related corruption, violence and instability as witnessed elsewhere in the world. In addition, the West Africa region has seen increased challenges from violent religious fundamentalist groups especially in Nigeria and Mali. Such groups could conceivably pose a threat to Liberia, not least because of the country's perceived pro-western bias. The continuous flow of small arms and light weapons into the region, as evidenced by the activities of Boko Haram and other extremist and terrorist groups, is also a major concern.

A major source of concern is the incomplete security sector reform in Liberia against the background of UNMIL draw down and transition, including the low level of police deployment across the country. The departure of UNMIL will create some security gaps that the Liberian security agencies will need to fill as a matter of urgency. As captured elsewhere in this report, these include but are not limited to, the following core areas: general public security, VIP protection, border management and patrol, maritime security, prison security and Explosive Ordnance Devices (EOD) – bomb disposal.

Against this backdrop, this plan therefore seeks to facilitate and speed up the process of preparing the Liberian security services to assume security responsibility with complete independence when UNMIL departs the country.

## **5. Assumptions and Risks**

- **Political will for reform**

The AfT recognizes that overcoming the major challenges in the development of the security sector requires political will. Given the tight security transition timeline set out by SCR 2190, political will at the highest levels and across all branches of Government will be essential for the successful implementation of this plan. While some critical issues would need to be tackled at the level of the Office of the President, others will involve various components of the Executive and the Legislature. For Liberia to make concrete progress towards developing the kind of security sector envisaged by the AfT and NSSRL it will be critical to have broad recognition and consensus across government that security transition is a national priority. Accordingly, each action/benchmark within this implementation plan, in addition to having an associated timeline, also identifies the responsible lead actor for implementation.

- **Whole of Government approach**

As outlined above in this plan's underlying principles, for Liberia to enjoy long-term peace and security, a whole-of-government approach is critical. Security must not be seen as simply the responsibility of the security agencies. All branches of government and all ministries, agencies, and commissions, have roles to play and must work effectively together towards a common goal.

- **Prioritization and sequencing**

As requested by SCR 2190, this plan establishes benchmarks and timelines for the various steps and stages envisaged in the process of building the security sector to the desired level. Adherence to these timelines and the sequence of ordered priorities will be critical to the successful implementation of the plan.

## **6. Challenges and thematic areas for intervention**

Liberia has made major strides in the development of its security sector since 2003. But much more needs to be done. The Government recognizes that, in addition to the inadequacy of budgetary and logistical resources, the institutional and operational weaknesses of Liberia's security sector pose major challenges for its development. The latter category include lack of human capacity, low professional standards, insufficient coordination, over-centralization of justice and security assets in Monrovia, endemic corruption, and a culture of impunity and a lack of accountability. Hence, these thematic areas, as well as other key challenges identified in the NSSRL and other national plans and strategies, as well as in recommendations from Government initiated reviews and national consultative discussions, have been captured below as relevant ingredients for delivering security services in an adequate manner when UNMIL departs Liberia.

- **Regulations, policy and legal frameworks**

The development of security legislation and policy frameworks has been at the centre of the SSR process in Liberia because some of the fundamental areas of institutional challenges and weaknesses within the security institutions can be traced to the obsolete, weak, or non-existing legal and policy frameworks, or to limitations in the implementation of recent legislation. The lack of a comprehensive legislative framework has, in turn, meant that vital internal reforms within the security sector, especially with regard to the professionalization of the service, could not be sufficiently implemented. More broadly, the policy-setting and oversight responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice, which has responsibility for most of the key security agencies, need to be clearly articulated and defined.

Notably, the country needs to ratify and domesticate certain international instruments that have implications for the work of its security institutions, such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms. Both are not only indissolubly linked with the *Fire Arms Control Act* that is yet to be enacted into law but also have implications for the lifting of the existing arms embargo on Liberia.

- **Accountability, oversight, professional standards and discipline**

Over the years, the government's policy frameworks have consistently emphasized the critical need for effective oversight, accountability and discipline within the security sector. There has been a stress on the need to reduce corrupt practices within security agencies. Further, as noted during the March 2013 National Conference on Criminal Justice, in view of UNMIL's transition, a heightened focus is needed on building institutional capacity, including effective management and accountability, recognizing the risks of building capacity in the security

sector without accompanying checks and balances. The Conference resolution stated, “Public confidence in the justice and security system requires strong internal and external oversight and accountability mechanisms.” The need to address management and accountability together has also been underscored, as well as the recognition that accountability is best exercised through a combination of mechanisms, namely those internal to security institutions, external state institutions, non-state entities, and an independent judiciary. These issues were reiterated in the recommendations of the National Security Sector Reform Retreat convened in October 2013.

This thematic section therefore encompasses a broad range of actions necessary for the security transition. Key components of this area include roles played by other institutions, in addition to the security actors themselves. The Legislature, as required by the Constitution, should be the lead external institution to exercise oversight over the entire security sector and the criminal justice system, but it remains a challenge for the Legislature to play an active role in reviewing and evaluating performance, as well as exercising due scrutiny over the resources and effectiveness of each institution. Stronger engagement and commitment by the Legislature is critical and there is a need to develop the capacity of Legislative security committees as well as to strengthen communication between the security committees and the security agencies. It is vital to build trust in this relationship, whilst recognizing the sometimes adversarial relationships in a system of checks and balances.

Civilian oversight has long been on the security sector reform agenda in Liberia largely because the country has a long history of poor and defective security sector governance and lack of public confidence. This has been emphasized in both the AFT and NSSRL. The development and expansion of internal oversight and disciplinary systems within security agencies is also seen as a priority, including the development of court martial capacity within the AFL. In this light, there is the need to establish effective systems for public complaints, for heads of security agencies to be required to report to the legislative committees on security related matters, disciplinary and professional standard issues, and for performance management to be implemented within security agencies.

Events in 2014 also underscored the need for clarity and progress in the accountability framework and mechanisms of the AFL. The legal framework requires clarification, both with respect to the body of laws that apply to criminal conduct by members of the AFL, as well as the justice institution that would exercise jurisdiction over military criminal conduct. Issues of command and control where both civilian and military entities are involved in an operation also require clarity as that may also have an impact on applicable rules of accountability. Lack of capacity remains an issue, particularly with respect to the military justice system.

There is need for greater collaboration among the integrity institutions, such as the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), the General Audit Commission, and the Public Procurement and Contract Commission (PPCC), as well as the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) and for standardized systems to address the overlapping functions of some of these institutions. The engagement of the integrity institutions directly with security actors is also essential. Regular reviews by the GAC of security institutions, as well as LACC guidance on the strength of anti-corruption systems, should also be promoted.

- **Improved national, regional, county and community service delivery**

The priority objectives in this area are: to build an inclusive security sector with a bottom-to-top approach, to strengthen the legitimacy of the security sector with local community involvement and to strengthen public trust and confidence in the security agencies and make their modus operandi people-centered and accessible. Community relationship with the security sector does not only need to be strengthened, there is also a need to increase community participation in security matters. Government policy frameworks place emphasis on democratic governance, human security as well as the deployment of security agencies throughout Liberia.

Public participation in the management of national security is vital to ensuring local ownership and the legitimization of the security sector. The National Security Strategy provides for the creation of County and District Security Councils in the 15 counties. Through the County and District Security Councils, which are presided over by local civilian authorities, vital security-related information, including those that might be county-specific can be identified and shared at various levels of Government, including the National Security Council (NSC), for appropriate policy intervention (s).

To-date only five County Security Councils have been established - in Lofa, Grand Gedeh, Montserrado, Nimba and River Gee. But even these four have not been functioning with the desired level of effectiveness due to lack of training and other capacities. Similarly, the County Peace Committees do have a role to play in providing security. Importantly, traditional institutions do also have a role to play in this direction. All of these local structures should be viewed as part of a system of early warning and early response security mechanisms through local security governance.

A related issue of relevance to public security is the need to improve access to justice with an emphasis on the critical role of prosecution, public defense and legal aid. The justice and security hubs remain relevant to the process of de-concentration and decentralization of justice and security delivery throughout the country. They will facilitate the response capability of the security institutions in the counties they cover if they are managed effectively and provided with the necessary logistics.

- **Strengthening coordination, cooperation and partnerships**

There is a multiplicity of actors in the security sector, and one of the challenges is the inadequate coordination among them. This can easily undermine the ability of the sector to deliver security services. Among the entities the AfT identified for alignment with the National Security Strategy were the Bureau of Correction and Rehabilitation, Customs and Excise, the Maritime Police, the Liberia Sea Port Police, the LACC investigation unit, and the Monrovia City Police. The 2014 National Defense Strategy requires the MoD and the AFL to liaise cooperate and collaborate with each other and support civil authorities.

The need to develop a coordinated national security system remains a priority in order to avoid duplication of roles and conflicts of interest, enhance international and regional law enforcement coordination and build synergy between the security and justice sectors. Given the nature of transnational crimes, the importance of regional collaboration at the MRU, ECOWAS and AU levels cannot be over-emphasized. Given the global nature



of some of today's security threats, there is also recognition of the need to collaborate and cooperate with governments and institutions outside Africa as necessary.

- **Recruitment and training of manpower - basic and specialized**

A key resource limitation that is faced by Liberia is the limited size of the security sector in general and the LNP and BIN specifically. Despite the national goal to raise the LNP's strength to 8,000, the impact of earlier delays in recruitment and the suspension of training during the EVD crisis make it unlikely that it will go much higher than 5000 men and women by 1 July 2016. The inadequate spread of police across the country as a whole is a matter of concern. Nevertheless, the increased professionalization of existing LNP personnel should take precedence over numerical strength of the force.

Strengthening the capacity of security agencies across a range of areas is essential to the success of the security transition. A prioritization of training needs will be critical in light of the timing of the security transition. Several of these areas have been previously identified. These include: enhanced investigative capacity; enhanced management and leadership skills; enhanced capacity for administrative and logistical management.

In addition to management and leadership weaknesses, there are other dynamics that may constrain effective management in law enforcement, including the wide use of political appointments which can impact on morale and effectiveness, an area where progress has been made but more remains to be done. There may also be training approaches that enhance management effectiveness across the sector. For example, opportunities for management training across entities may be beneficial in fostering greater cooperation among security actors.

The enhancement of leadership capacity relies to a significant degree on meaningful, merit-based opportunities for advancement, which create the incentive for effectiveness and efficiency. After over 11 years of capacity building, the LNP has a large, strong, well-trained and capable middle management cadre, ready to take up the more senior management responsibilities, if provided with the opportunity. Promoting this cadre to senior leadership positions will reward excellence, improve institutional morale and significantly enhance professionalism.

Recruitment of qualified security personnel via transparent and equitable vetting processes, reflecting Liberia's ethnic, gender and religious diversity, to be trained in line with international standards will lay a solid foundation for the future development and effectiveness of the security agencies.

### **Development and enhancement of infrastructure and logistical capacity**

An integral part of the broader SSR process in the country is development of the infrastructural, logistical and technical capacity of the various agencies that constitute the security sector. This will involve, among other things, the construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure such as barracks for agencies such as the LNP, BIN and BCR. Given the current state of the prisons throughout the country, which lack basic facilities, there is also a

need to construct new ones, but more urgently , to rehabilitate and equip the existing ones. There is need to construct depots and border plazas for effective border management and security.

Many of the agencies lack logistics, particularly vehicles to facilitate mobility and emergency response. Forensic laboratories and expertise are required to support access to justice and facilitate successful prosecution. Lethal and non-lethal weapons, restraining equipment, communication equipment as well as uniforms and accessories are required to enhance effective delivery of security services. These are woefully lacking and undermine the operational efficiency of the services.

- **Systemic restructuring and institutionalization**

Improvements in management and administrative systems are essential to the enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of security institutions. There are concerns over the overly bureaucratic management chain of these institutions (too many minor administrative or operational issues being routinely referred to senior levels), incongruous chains of command, and lack of decentralization, delegation of authority and responsibility. This management system makes decision-making slow and ineffective.

There is also concern over the fact that in some of these institutions there is no formally approved organizational or ranking structure: existing structures lack legal basis and formal approval and adoption.

Moreover, effective measures are needed to operationalize existing policies and procedures, in particular the rank/promotion, performance appraisal and professional standards policies. The absence of an effective combination of positive inducements/ tangible rewards (pay increases; transparent, merit-based assignments, appointments, transfers, postings, rotations, trainings and refresher courses, awarding of ranks and promotions) and sanctions meted out by internal oversight, accountability and disciplinary systems, continues to undermine the integrity of these institutions, block equal opportunities for all, disincentivize excellence, professionalism and behavioral/attitudinal improvement.

- **Operational efficiency, effectiveness and performance (including specific security tasks to be handed over by UNMIL)**

Operational efficiency, effectiveness and performance encompass a range of issues, which also overlap with other thematic areas already mentioned in this plan. Indeed, progress in any of the thematic areas would result in greater efficiency and effectiveness. In the context of the security tasks to be handed over by UNMIL, there are certain issues that will require particular attention.

In particular, establishing or strengthening the rapid response capabilities that UNMIL provides at present requires near-term progress in a number of key areas, in order to enable an effective response footprint. Strengthened mobility and communications capacities are key elements to taking on UNMIL's rapid response functions. Enhanced logistics, considered broadly, are also essential. Synergies through a whole-of-government

approach may be particularly relevant. For example, improvements in roads and transportation facilities would greatly enhance incident response capabilities.

A focused planning process is necessary within the LNP, BIN and other security agencies in order to concretely identify the steps that each agency will need to take to give adequate time for the development of the necessary capacities, including skills training. Key synergies among security actors must be vigorously identified in order to achieve efficiencies in light of financial constraints. The planning process also needs to consider alternative options for achieving an adequate rapid response capability, bearing in mind financial realities.

Early, realistic planning for the manpower resources needed for the security agencies to take over UNMIL's security tasks will also be necessary. It is evident, for example, that LNP's manpower will not reach the levels envisioned for full capacity by June 2016. Realistic manpower capacity projections need to be made and factored into all planning processes. Some of the concrete areas that need urgent attention include the following:

- Protection of Civilians
- Transnational Organized Crime such as drugs and trafficking in persons
- Disaster Response
- Intelligence capacity building
- Prioritizing the investigation of specific types of crime – rape and corruption
- Effective border security and management
- Effective fire prevention and control

Although some of these are gaps that will be created with the departure of UNMIL, they also constitute broader security concerns that the security institutions are duty bound to respond to.

- **Specific security tasks undertaken by UNMIL to be handed over**

As discussed earlier, one of the challenges that the Government will need to address has to do with the level of preparedness of the security agencies to fill in the gaps to be left by the departure of UNMIL by the end of 2016.

The core areas of work that relate to this are as follow:

VIP protection (EPS)

Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) – bomb disposal (AFL)

Prison security (BCR and LNP)

Management and monitoring the importation and use of fire arms (LNP and LINCSEA)

Maritime security (Coast Guard),

Border management and patrol (BIN, DEA, and Customs)

Static Guarding (LNP, EPS and AFL)

Cash Escorts (LNP)

- **Improved conditions of service for security sector personnel**

The National Security Strategy of Liberia identifies as a guiding principle the establishment of a system of recruitment of new personnel that is based on transparency and robust vetting processes and reflects Liberia's diverse ethnic, and religious balance, emphasises merit in the selection and promotion of personnel, and ensures timely and adequate remuneration in order to promote efficiency and loyalty to the state and people of Liberia. The 2013 Public Expenditure Review by the World Bank identified, as a key part of human resources management reform, the need for an assessment of the staffing requirements, pay and grading structures, and incentives to enhance career progression prospects.

Core considerations for conditions of service can be guided by the *National Security and Intelligence Act*. There should be clear and transparent regulations or orders related to special allowances for staff related to officially authorized activities, where the payment of allowances is necessary to meet specified work requirement. Consideration should be given for clarity, certainty and transparency regarding death and retirement benefits, disability, and health insurance. These considerations should be guided by financial realities.

The need for certainty and transparency in the allocation, delivery and actual payment of allowances is directly related to operational effectiveness. LNP officers have often been unwilling to move to their deployments without first receiving their allowances. This challenge requires focused review to identify solutions that can ensure that operational exigencies are not compromised by what is, essentially, a lack of confidence on the part of security personnel that they will be fairly and timely compensated. Establishing trust is an essential component of finding solutions to this perennial issue. Overall, the issue of the conditions of service are directly linked with the need to ensure economic security for personnel of the sector and the ability of government to provide it.

### **7. Implementation of the plan**

A number of international organizations and bilateral donors are currently supporting the development of the Liberian security sector. The two largest programmes are those of the UN and the USA. UNMIL currently has approximately 450 advisers working with the LNP, DEA, BIN and Bureau of Corrections. In addition, support is provided by other components of UNMIL's Rule of Law Pillar to the justice and corrections sectors and to legal reform. In addition, the UN's Peacebuilding Fund has supported the decentralization of justice and security services through the Justice and Security Hubs concept in Gbarnga, Zwedru and Harper, while the UN Justice and Security Trust Fund has coordinated donor support to the rule of law sector. UNDP has also provided support to the sector. The United States government has provided training and mentoring to the AFL through its operation *Onward Liberty* as well as direct support to the police and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) through its Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Programme. Other donors, such as Ireland, UK, Australia, Germany, Nigeria, Netherlands, China, Sweden and Norway have focused on rule of law support and

areas such as training and logistics. The European Commission provides direct budgetary support to the sector in 2015.

**(i) Resource mobilization/financing:**

Whilst many of the actions necessary to develop and reform the security sector require political commitment, there is also a clear need for increased financial support to the sector if it is to be in a position to provide real security for communities across Liberia. The primary source of funding must be the national budget. It will be critical for both the Executive and the Legislature to prioritize security sector funding and ensure adequate and guaranteed national budgetary allocations, not only for the 2015/2016 financial year, but for a 3-5 year period. The 2013 Liberia Public Expenditure Review - Meeting the Challenges of the UNMIL Security Transition, conducted by the World Bank and UNMIL in collaboration with the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Justice and Defense, encouraged a strategic focus on the sustainable financing of the security sector, embracing the medium term expenditure framework (MTFEF) to allow the security sector to plan effectively. Joint budgetary planning and development across the sector has proven to be successful in other countries in raising allocations across the sector and the intention is for a joint approach to be taken in Liberia during the development of the 2015/2016 budget. Additionally, recommendations from the SSR Retreat of 2013 propose the provision of training by the Ministry of Finance to other ministries and agencies in planning and implementing budgets, including development of budget proposals through the annual budget cycle, adherence to procurement regulations, and implementation of activities (prioritized and sequenced) and report on budget execution.

Furthermore, the security sector itself will have to do more to improve financial management, transparency and accountability; effective use of existing resources; as well as coordination and cost-savings among agencies as this will assist the sector in reducing corruption and costs, improving efficiency, targeting resources to priority needs. A key area where more appropriate and transparent use of existing resources can be made is with respect to the allowances paid within justice and security sector institutions. These costs form a substantial percentage of agency budgets but are not allocated in any systematic way. Using these resources more effectively within each agency, and linking them to salaries, for example, to reward good performance or provide additional compensation for deployment outside Monrovia, would not only remove one of the root causes of dissatisfaction and low morale in the security sector, but also provide a resource for incentives, which has long been requested by personnel in the sector.

Rigid and scrupulous enforcement of security regulations through the payment of fines as penalties can raise considerable revenues, thereby contributing to meeting the capacity and financial needs of the security sector. For example, according to the MoJ Annual Report (2014), compared to other years, in 2014, the BIN alone raised a total of US\$ 2,159,245.00 as revenue for various services delivered. The DEA confiscated a total of US\$ 187, 902.00 worth of drugs, at street value. With concerted and focused efforts, more could be done to scale up internal revenue generation within the security sector. The LNP gives little or no report on revenue generated.

One of the areas in which LNP faces challenges in maintaining the rule of law is traffic violations; this and other areas could generate considerable revenue for the LNP. A purposeful policy intervention by the Ministry of Justice geared toward improvement of the internal revenue generation capacities of the security agencies could help to significantly increase budgetary allocations to the security sector. The Ministry of Justice will have to develop a special interest in this area and drive the process with robust supervision, including through the adoption of a zero tolerance posture to fight corruption in the security sector.

There is also a need to increase donor support to the security sector and ensure that this is sustained after UNMIL completes its drawdown. Keeping traditional donors engaged and engaging new partners, especially those based in Liberia, will be essential to the successful implementation of this Plan. The Minister of Justice, working in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, will lead these efforts, with UNMIL's support. This will involve the convening of a Donor Conference and an increased engagement with the UN Peacebuilding Commission, to increase their resource mobilization role in support of Liberia, as laid out in the Statement of Mutual Commitments. A regional engagement strategy should also be developed.

Finally, the mobilization of resources for this plan and subsequent ones is also linked with the success of economic recovery without which government will find it challenging to address its national security concerns.

## **8. Implementation architecture**

The overarching objective of the implementation architecture for this security transition plan is to resolve any bureaucratic impediments through continuous oversight as well as vigorous and timely interventions. The basis for this architecture is to ensure that the plan is implemented with strong government commitment and in an environment free of unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles.

The implementation framework comprises three level: policy, operational, and technical. At the policy level, the National Security Council (NSC) will provide strategic policy direction and intervene on critical and sensitive issues requiring policy decisions. Although the composition of the NSC shall remain in keeping with the law; it may invite participants as deemed relevant when sitting to address issues pertaining to the transition process. In this vein, they will meet regularly when deemed necessary to address critical issues that require policy decision.

The Joint Implementation Group (JIG) will serve as the operational component and will be responsible for the actual implementation of the GOL Plan for UNMIL Transition. It will provide operational level guidance and solutions for the implementation of the plan. The JIG will be chaired by the Minister of Justice (MoJ) and co-chaired by the UNMIL SRSG, the Minister of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), Minister of Defense, US Ambassador, and an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. It shall be composed of the Ministers of Internal Affairs (MIA); Information, Culture and Tourism (MICAT); and the Directors of Police, NSA, LNFS, EPS, the Commissioner of BIN; the National Security Advisor; Chairman of Liberia National Commission on Small Arms

(LiNCSA); and UNMIL/DSRSG for Rule of Law;. JIG will meet monthly on a day to be determined during its first sitting.


The Technical level shall comprise two parallel layers that will be responsible for providing technical level implementation direction and performance management, reporting processes, and monitoring and evaluation of implementation actions and benchmarks. The first layer shall be the GoL Security Transition Taskforce (GSTT) to be chaired by a Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Justice and Co-chaired by a Deputy Minister of the MOD, MIA, and Deputy Director of the LNP. Deputy Directors and Commissioners along with a maximum of two staff each from all implementation lead institutions (MOJ/LNP, MOJ/BIN, MOJ/DEA, MOJ/LNFS, the EPS, MOD/AFL, LiNCSA, NSCS, Judiciary/Court Administrator, etc.). The GSTT's lead institutions will be responsible for the day-to-day implementation of actions in the transition implementation matrix. It shall be their sole responsibility to achieve and report to the GSTT progress and impediments for immediate action to remedy the situation. The GSTT will meet bi-Weekly on days to be decided by the task force. The Chair of the GSTT, under the direct authority of the MOJ, will lead coordination efforts to implement GoL's Plan for UNMIL Transition, and serve as the chair of the Joint Secretariat.

The second layer shall be the UNMIL Security Transition Taskforce (USTT) to be chaired by the DSRSG for Rule of Law and co-chaired by an institution to be determined by the USTT. It shall comprise of UNPOL, the Force, DMS, PAS, PIO, CDG, CT, and others as deemed necessary by UNMIL. The USTT will meet bi-Weekly on days to be decided by the taskforces.

The Joint Technical Transition Secretariat (JTTS) comprising both the GSTT and USTT will be established to address transition issues that may require joint technical actions or decisions. JTTS will facilitate information flow both between UNMIL and the Government (and donors) as well as among the GoL Plan implementation framework, Aft, JSPB, and PSF. The JTTS will disseminate its output to enhance feedback on proposals and allow the timely review of drafts required for implementation. It will meet in the third week of every month.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will provide external indirect oversight over the UNMIL Transition process. It will provide overall directives for UNMIL, through its resolutions. It will also receive regular reporting from the NSC.

The transition plan is directly aligned to the Aft and its Peace, Justice, Security and Rule of Law Pillar; the Justice and Security Programme Board (JSPB); and the Police Support Forum (PSF) given that the focus is on policing. A detail term of reference (TOR) will be developed for each levels of the implementation architecture.



**(i) Management of Funds for the Project**

It is envisaged that the implementation of this plan will require the establishment of a Special Project Fund that will run parallel to the existing recurrent budgets of the various agencies. Under this arrangement, the Ministry of Justice will supervise and manage the fund. A special unit within the MOJ could be set up to manage, supervise and disburse project funds on time. Such arrangement could facilitate the smooth, efficient and timely implementation of this plan.

**9. Monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the plan**

Monitoring and reporting should take into consideration the direct link between the National Security Council (NSC), policy-related and the Joint Security National Commission, led by the Ministry of Justice, which is

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responsible for operations and coordination. The relationship between the two and the respect for them is vital to ensure proper co-ordination.

On the other hand, the Justice, Peace, Security and Rule of Law Pillar is another architecture of the security sector. Proper coordination between and amongst these layers of security governance is very important.

Coordination and clarity of duties will reduce duplication and overlapping of functions in the delivery of justice and security services; it also ensures timely decision-making; and ultimately, improves the quality of justice and security services being provided.



**GOVERNMENT OF LIBERIA PLAN FOR UNMIL TRANSITION  
MARCH 2015 TO 30 JUNE 2016**

**Benchmarks, Consolidated Activities and Leads, and Timelines**

<b>BENCHMARK</b>	<b>CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>LEAD</b>	<b>TIMELINE</b>
<b>I. Whole of government approach to security transition adopted</b>	<b>1.1 The Government of Liberia undertakes a review to assess full impact of UNMIL drawdown across all sectors and a re-prioritization of resources prior to the finalization of the 2015/2016 national budget</b>	<b>Office of the President</b>	<b>April 2015</b>
	<b>1.2 Inclusion of justice and security sector within Liberia's post-Ebola recovery plan</b>	<b>Office of the President</b>	<b>March – June 2015</b>
	<b>1.3 National budgetary process for 2015/2016 complies with timelines to ensure passage of the budget on time</b>	<b>MoF / Legislature</b>	<b>March – June 2015</b>
	<b>1.4 Responsibility for inspection and oversight of Government owned weapons assumed from UNMIL</b>	<b>LiNCSA</b>	<b>October 2015</b>
	<b>1.4 Responsibility for road maintenance and internal air links to maintain key lines of communications assumed from UNMIL</b>	<b>MoPW/ MoT</b>	<b>June 2016</b>
<b>2. Key legal, policy and regulatory frameworks established</b>	<b>2.1 New Police Act enacted with associated costs included in the 2015/2016 budget</b>	<b>MoJ</b>	<b>May 2015</b>
	<b>2.2 Amendment of Defense Act</b>	<b>MoD</b>	<b>June 2016</b>

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	2.3 Enactment of Universal Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) legislation	MoD	May 2016
	2.4 Key regulatory policy frameworks institutionalized for the LNP, BIN, DEA, BCR, including review of LNP and BIN Duty Manuals and development of SOP for EPS	MoJ and NSC Secretariat	March – June 2015
	2.5 Immigration Services Act enacted	MoJ	November 2015
	2.6 Revision of Immigration and Nationality Law	MoJ	March – June 2015
	2.7 Private security companies regulated	MoJ	August 2015
	2.8 Firearms and Ammunition Control Act enacted with associated costs reflected in 2015/16 Budget	LiNCSA	May 2015
	2.9 Firearms Regulations formulated	LiNCSA	June-December 2015
	2.10 LiNCSA Regulations and SOPs developed	LiNCSA	June 2015- June 2016

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE												
	<p>2.10 Liberia National Police Policy Review Board established</p> <p>2.11 Enact new legislation establishing the Office of the Medical Examiner of Liberia</p> <p>2.11 New legislation establishing the BCR as an autonomous agency developed and enacted</p> <p>2.12 New legislation establishing the Office of the Medical Examiner of Liberia developed and enacted</p>	<p>MoJ</p> <p>MoJ</p> <p>MoJ/BCR</p> <p>OSG</p>	<p>August 2015</p> <p>July – Dec 2015</p> <p>July 2015-June 2016</p> <p>July-December 2015</p>												
<p>3. Trained security sector personnel in place to take over full security responsibilities</p>	<p>3.1 Essential new recruit training initiated and new recruits included on the payroll:</p> <table border="0" data-bbox="485 1019 1472 1386"> <tr> <td data-bbox="485 1019 1150 1068">LNP</td> <td data-bbox="1157 1019 1472 1068">315 personnel</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="485 1073 1150 1122"></td> <td data-bbox="1157 1073 1472 1122">675 personnel</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="485 1127 1150 1175"></td> <td data-bbox="1157 1127 1472 1175">675 personnel</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="485 1180 1150 1229">BIN</td> <td data-bbox="1157 1180 1472 1229">250 personnel</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="485 1234 1150 1282"></td> <td data-bbox="1157 1234 1472 1282">254 personnel</td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="485 1287 1150 1336"></td> <td data-bbox="1157 1287 1472 1336">254 personnel</td> </tr> </table>	LNP	315 personnel		675 personnel		675 personnel	BIN	250 personnel		254 personnel		254 personnel	<p>LNP</p> <p>BIN</p>	<p>March - August 2015</p> <p>Sep 2015 – Feb 2016</p> <p>March – August 2016</p> <p>April – June</p>
LNP	315 personnel														
	675 personnel														
	675 personnel														
BIN	250 personnel														
	254 personnel														
	254 personnel														

BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES		LEAD	TIMELINE
		DEA	135 personnel 270 personnel	DEA	2015 Dec 2015 – Feb 2016 April – June 2016
		EPS	200 personnel	EPS	May – August 2015
		AFL	400 personnel	AFL/MOD	Sep 2015 – Feb 2016
		Judiciary	60 personnel	Judiciary	January 2016
		LNFS	73 personnel	LNFS	December 2015
		LiNCSA	12 personnel	LiNCSA	March – Dec 2015
		Prosecution	76 personnel	O/SG	March- June 2015
		BCR	140 personnel	BCR	Jun 2015-Jun

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
			2016  Jun 2015 – Jun 2016  Apr 2015 – Jan 2016
	<b>3.2 Specialized training conducted for the Police Support Unit</b>  150 personnel 150 personnel 150 personnel 150 personnel	LNP	Aug – Oct 2015 Nov 2015 – Jan 2016 Feb – April 2016 May – July 2016
	<b>3.3 Refresher training for LNP officers conducted</b>  100 personnel 100 personnel 100 personnel 100 personnel 100 personnel	LNP	September 2015 October 2015 November 2015 January 2016

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	100 personnel		February 2016 March 2016
	3.4 Development of in service and specialized training capacity and curricula developed within the LNP and BIN	LNP NPTA/BIN	March – July 2015
	3.5 Leadership training conducted for senior and middle managers, including county commanders, or security sector agencies  DEA (50 managers) LiNCSA (7 managers) BCR (20 managers)	DEA LiNCSA BCR	March 2014- June 2016  March-April 2016  Apr – Aug 2015
	3.6 Specialized training conducted for the LNP in Forensics, Organized Crime, Human Rights, Investigations, Intelligence, Community Policing, and Professional Standards	LNP/NPTA	April 2015- June 2016
	3.7 Joint specialized trainings conducted for police and prosecutors to increase capacity to successfully investigate and prosecute cases of rape and corruption	MoJ	April – Sep 2015
	3.8 BIN training academy in Foya, Lofa County established	BIN	By June 2015



BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	<p>3.9 Firearms training provided for 250 BIN BPU officers by June 2016  125 personnel  125 personnel</p>	BIN	<p>Jan – Feb 2016  March- April 2016</p>
	<p>3.10 Armory management training provided for the BIN</p>	BIN	<p>Nov 2015</p>
	<p>3.11 Specialized training conducted for the BIN in Immigration Management, Fraud Detection, Cross Border Crime, Smuggling, Forensics and preservation of evidence, Organized Crime, Human Trafficking, Arms Trafficking, Intelligence gathering and analysis, IT, communications, human resources, and fleet and facilities management</p>	BIN	<p>April 2015- June 2016</p>
	<p>3.12 In-service training for EPS (469 officers)</p>	EPS	<p>June 2016</p>
	<p>3.13 AFL Coastguard assumes responsibility for maritime patrols from UNMIL</p>	AFL	<p>June 2016</p>
	<p>3.14 Assumption of responsibility for security at corrections facilities by the Police Support Unit from UNMIL</p>	LNP	<p>December 2015</p>
	<p>3.15 Specialized training for Corrections Response Unit (to assume responsibility for security at corrections facilities from the Police Support Unit in April 2016)</p>	BCR	<p>Government of Liberia Plan for UNMIL Transition March 2015 to 30 June 2016   2/1/2015</p>

BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
		70 personnel 70 personnel 78 personnel		Apr-Aug 2015 Sep 2015-Jan 2016 Feb – Apr 2016
		3.16 In-service training for corrections personnel to be conducted by BCR National Trainers	BCR	Apr-June 2015
		3.17 Advanced training for 400 AFL personnel conducted	MoD/AFL	June 2016
		3.18 Specialized training for the AFL to assume responsibility from UNMIL of EOD/ERW destruction (by June 2015) conducted	MoD/AFL	March – May 2016
		3.19 Training for decentralized Small Arms Unit conducted	LNP/LINSCA	July 2015- April 2016
		3.20 Assumption of responsibility for VIP protection by EPS from UNMIL	EPS	Dec 2015
		3.21 Recruitment and vetting exercise for 270 applicants undertaken by DEA	DEA	May- August 2015

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	3.22 Training of 60 new Magistrates and 60 clerks for deployment in support of decentralization of justice services	Judiciary	March – Dec 2015
	3.23 Sensitization for 200 Magistrates on new legislation	Judiciary	March – Dec 2015
	3.24 Specialized training of 40 Public Defenders to provide free legal representation	Judiciary	March – Dec 2015
	3.25 Training for 25 new prosecutors (other 5 newly recruited prosecutors are experienced lawyers for dealing with SGBV and corruption)	O/SG	June - July 2015
	3.26 One pathologist recruited (Liberia’s first)	O/SG	July 2015–June 2016
	3.27 Assumption of static security responsibilities, including airport security, from UNMIL	RIA/LNP	June 2016
	3.28 Management system for LiNCSA established	LiNCSA	July 2015
	3.29 Training in SALW Control for 20 security sector personnel and arms marking training for 18 security sector personnel and database management for 11 security sector personnel	LiNCSA	June 2015

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BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	3.30 All Government Firearms marked according to ECOWAS standards	LiNCSA	April-Nov 2015
	3.31 Hire a Security Sector Coordinator	MoJ	March-June 2015
	3.32 Train 75 Paralegals	MoJ	July-December 2015
4. Increased professionalism within the security sector	4.1 All new legislation for security sector agencies to address criteria for appointment to and removal from leadership positions to avoid the politicization of the security sector	MoJ/MoD	March 2015 – June 2016
	4.2 Promotions policies within the LNP and BIN to be reviewed, updated and implemented to ensure a merit-based promotions system and to include strategies for the promotion of women	MoJ	March – June 2015
	4.3 Organizational structure of security sector agencies to be reviewed and updated to include clear reporting lines, chain of command, ranking structure and job descriptions		
	LNP BIN DEA BCR	MoJ MoJ MoJ MoJ	May 2015 May 2015 June 2016 November

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES		LEAD	TIMELINE
		<p>4.4 Strategic plans for the: LNP BIN BCR</p> <p>to be finalized following an inclusive planning process</p>	<p>LNP BIN BCR</p>	<p>2015</p> <p>March 2015 June 2016 Aug - Nov 2016</p>
		<p>4.5 Deactivation of security sector personnel BIN: Retire 800 BIN personnel ( with USD 4000 retirement package) DEA: Retire 32 DEA officers LNFS: Retire 26 employees</p>	<p>BIN DEA LNFS</p>	<p>July 2015-June 2016 Jul 2015- Jun 2016 Jun 2015 -Jun 2016</p>
<p>5. Improved justice and security service delivery across Liberia</p>		<p>5.1 Deployment of justice and security sector personnel across Liberia, in line with criteria including population distribution and security needs</p> <p>LNP personnel 1,655 BIN TBD DEA TBD</p>	<p>LNP BIN DEA</p>	<p>July 2015-June 2016 TBD TBD</p>

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BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES		LEAD	TIMELINE
	BCR personnel	210	BCR	Judiciary	July 2015-June 2016
	Judiciary personnel	120	Judiciary	Judiciary	March-Dec 2015
	Public Defenders personnel	12	O/SG	LiNCSA	March-Dec 2015
	Prosecution personnel	45			August-Sept 2015
	LiNCSA personnel	10			July 2015-June 2016
	5.2 Manpower deployment policy, including rotation provisions, reviewed, approved and implemented				
	LNP		MoJ		June 2015
	BIN		MoJ		June 2015
	5.2 Review, approval and implementation of allowances systems within the LNP, BIN, BCR, Prosecution, DEA and Judiciary to utilize this budget line to support deployment costs and incentives for personnel deployed outside of Monrovia and to reward high performance			MoJ and Judiciary	May 2015
	5.3 Establish 10 County and 126 District Security Councils , and County and District Security Councils operational in all 15 counties			NSC Secretariat/ Ministry of Internal Affaires	July-Aug 2015 &
	5.3.1 Establish County Peace Committees and early warning –early response mechanisms throughout Liberia				Oct 2015-Jan 2016 & July 2016 –June

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
			2018
	5.4 Comprehensive LNP community policing policy (including decentralization of the Community Services Section) developed and implementation commenced	LNP	June 2015
	5.5 Roll out of justice and security services through five Justice and Security Hubs	MoJ, Judiciary, INCHR	Mar 2015-June 2016
	5.6 Establish drug Intelligence collection and management system in the 15 counties	DEA	Jul 2015 - Jun 2016
	5.7 4 events conducted to register private firearms (single-barrel)	LiNCSA	January- Jun 2016
	5.8 SALW Baseline Survey conducted	LiNCSA	June 2015-Feb 2016
	5.9 Jury Management Offices established nationwide	Judiciary	Mar 2015- Mar 2016
	5.10 Rehabilitation programs established nationwide to reduce recidivism	BCR	Mar 2015-Jun 2016

BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
		5.11 Paralegal system formally established and operational and funded from national budget	MoJ	July 2015
		5.12 Establish 5 Divisions in the Department of Prosecution (Anti-Corruption, Economic Crimes, Sex and Gender Based Violence, Civil Litigation and Appellate Divisions)	OSG	
		5.13 Establish a witness protection system/program	OSG	July-December 2016
		5.14 Establish paralegal mechanism in Liberia	MoJ	April-December 2015
		5.15 Establish 3 new Offices within MoJ (Office of Budget Planning and Research, Office of Internal Oversight, Office of legal Council)	MoJ	April-June 2015
6. Administrative systems established to enable and sustain effective institutional performance of security sector agencies		6.1 LNP Change Management Committee reconstituted	LNP	March 2015
		6.2 Assignment of LNP officers with dedicated administrative responsibilities to all county headquarters	LNP	June 2015
		6.3 Decentralized Fleet Management System established and implemented nationwide for LNP, BIN and the Judiciary	LNP, BIN, Judiciary	Jul 2015 - Mar 2016
		6.4 Decentralized Facilities Management System established and implemented		Jul 2015 – Mar



BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	nationwide for LNP and BIN	LNP,BIN, Judiciary	2016
	6.5 Human Resources Management systems established and implemented nationwide for LNP, BIN and the Judiciary	LNP,BIN, Judiciary	Jul 2015 – Mar 2016
	6.6 Financial reporting of justice and security agencies undertaken in compliance with PPCC, LACC, and GAC regulations	All institutions	March 2015- June 2016
	6.7 Decentralized Logistics Capability established and implemented nationwide for LNP and BIN	LNP and BIN	By Dec 2015
7. Effective oversight, accountability and disciplinary mechanisms established for security sector agencies	7.1 Civilian oversight board established and operational Legislation passed Start up and operational costs included in the 2015/2016 budget Personnel appointed	MoJ	November 2015
	7.2 Periodic reporting by security agencies to the Legislature initiated	All institutions	April 2015
	7.3 Capacity building support for the Defense, Security and Judiciary Committees of the Legislature	Legislature	July 2015-Feb 2016
	7.4 LNP Professional Standards Division formally established under the Police		March – Sep

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	Act and decentralized to 5 regions/15 counties and appropriately funded within the LNP budget	LNP	2015
	7.5 Clear, accessible and publicized mechanisms established for public reporting on misconduct by security agency personnel including procedures for feedback to the public on complaints made	All security agencies	November 2015
	7.6 Court martial capacity within the AFL established/ Operationalization of UCMJ	MOD	May 2016
	7.7 Plan of action finalized clarifying criminal jurisdiction between MoJ and MoD, over military officers, including changes in legal/regulatory framework	MoJ MoD	May 2015
	7.8 Disciplinary regulations for MoJ agencies enacted and implemented nationwide	MoJ	July 2015
	7.9 Regular engagement between security agencies and LACC formalized	MoJ, LACC and institutions	April 2015- June 2016

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
<p>8. Coordination, collaboration and partnerships strengthened within the security sector and between Liberia and regional and international law enforcement partners</p>	8.1 Ministry of Justice convenes Joint Security Committee meetings weekly	MoJ	March 2015- June 2016
	8.2 Ministry of Justice to be restructured to effectively undertake its policy and oversight responsibilities over the LNP, BIN, DEA, and BCR	MoJ	March - August 2015
	8.3 Review of MoU for the TCU and recommendations of its Management Board for full operationalization and sustainability implemented by all member agencies	MoJ	Apr 2015- May 2016
	8.4 MOU developed between LNP and BCR with respect to provision of prison security following withdrawal of FPU support	LNP /BCR	June/July 2015
	8.5 Regular engagement between O/SG and County Attorneys with the LNP Crime Services Division instituted	LNP/O/SG	March 2015
	8.6 Establish coordination mechanisms through Legislature Security Sector Resource Center	NSCS	July- September 2015
	8.7 Establish central SALW Database	LiNCSA	June-Sep 2015
	8.8 Intelligence Coordination framework developed and implemented	NSA	July – Dec 2015

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BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
		8.9 Interagency SALW Coordination meetings convened monthly	LiNCSA	Mar 2015-June 2016
		8.10 Participation in and implementation of regional security coordination mechanisms( including the Mano River Union Cross Border Peace and Security Project, 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the West Africa Coast Initiative Transnational Crime Unit)	MoFA, MoJ, LNP,BIN, DEA, TCU	March 2015-June 2016
		8.11 Development of integrated national strategy for engagement with international partners (including Interpol and the International Civil Aviation Authority )	MoFA, MoJ	March 2015-June 2016
		8.12 Strengthen MoJ Joint Security Coordination Framework through seminars and sensitization activities	MoJ	April 2015-June 2016
9. Increased focus on human rights observance		9.1 Review of LNP detention facilities undertaken and allocations for upgrading facilities included within the 2015/2016 budget	LNP	March-June 2015
		9.2 Improved observance of 48-hour constitutional detention period	MoJ/LNP	March-June 2015
10. Increased effectiveness and transparency in the financial management		10.1 Joint budgetary development process established for the security sector with allocations aligned to strategic priorities	MoJ/institutions	April-December 2015

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
of security agencies	10.2 Consultative budgetary planning systems established in the LNP and BIN	LNP/BIN	Feb – April 2015
	10.3 Implementation of regular training by Ministry of Finance for security agencies	MoF	March 2015- June 2016
	10.4 Financial reporting of security agencies to be developed in accordance with PPCC, LACC and GAC regulations	All institutions	From March 2015
	10.5 Salaries in the LNP and BIN to be transparent and standardized across rank	LNP	March -July 2015
11. Improved conditions of service for security sector personnel	11.1 LNP salaries increased by USD50 per month in the 2015/2016 budget	LNP	July 2015
	11.2 Improve BIN base salary up to USD 250	BIN	July 2015
	11.3 Provide USD 400 resettlement grant for new BIN recruits	BIN	July 2015
	11.4 Improve BCR base salaries at all ranks	BCR	Mar 2015-Feb 2016
	11.5 Improve incentives of the new 135 DEA officers by USD 100	DEA	Jul 2015 - Jun 2016

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BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
		11.6 Medical and health insurance and retirement packages in place for security sector personnel	MoJ/NSC	By June 2016
		11.7 Increase Salaries of prosecutors	OSG	July 2015- June 2016
12. Enhanced operational efficiency and effectiveness		12.1 Expansion of NPTA facilities	LNP	Jul 2015 – June 2016
		12.2 Equipping of LNP Forensic Laboratory	LNP	Jul 2015 - April 2016
		12.3 Construct and furnish barracks in critical areas for deployment 5 LNP 7 BCR	LNP BCR	Jul 2015 - June 2016 Mar 2015-June 2016
		12.4 Construct and furnish strategic border gates and 8 border plazas in border counties	BIN	By June 2016
		12.5 Essential renovations undertaken at Liberia’s two principal corrections and minor improvements at county facilities to improve security in light of UNMIL drawdown and establishment of BCR regional HQs MCP NPC	BCR	Apr-Aug 2015 Sep-Dec 2015

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	Counties Regional HQs		Apr-Jun 2015 Mar 2015-June 2016
	12.6 Construction of Cheesemanburg Prison completed	BCR	Mar – June 2016
	12.7 Complete construction of AFL Camp Todee Phase II (AFL)	MoD	June 2016
	12.8 Camp Ware Phase I Construction completed (AFL)	MoD	June 2016
	12.9 Construction of Coastguard base	MOD	June 2016
	12.10 Construct and equip 6 Fire sub-stations	LNFS	June 2016
	12.11 Construction of 5 magistrates courts	Judiciary	Jan – Jun 2016
	12.12 1 LiNCSA HQ building and 5 regional offices (linked to hubs)	LiNCSA	July 2015 - June 2016
	12.13 Acquire Office Space, furniture and equipment for Office of the Medical Examiner	OSG	July 2015- Jun 2016
	12.14 Acquire office space, furniture and equipment for prosecution division	OSG	July 2015- Jun

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
			2016
	12.15 Establish a dedicated morgue facility at JFK Hospital	OSG	July 2015- June 2016
	12.16 Installation of solar panels at corrections facilities	BCR	Mar 2015 – June 2016
	12.17 Provide Office Equipment, furniture and stationary for paralegals	MoJ	January- June 2016
	12.18 Provision of facilities maintenance costs for key facilities of LNP (5 facilities)	LNP	Jul 2015 - June 2016
	12.19 Acquire mobility.... (vehicles/motorbikes/ .... Including fuel, insurance, repair and maintenance costs  LNP (40 vehicles, 70 motorbikes,3 troop carriers) BIN (13 pickup trucks, 30 motor bikes and 1 troop carrier) DEA (30 pickup trucks and 63 motorbikes for deployed DEA personnel) BCR (8 vehicles, 1 security mini-bus ) EPS (8 vehicles and 6 motor bikes) Judiciary (15 pickup trucks, 60 motorbikes) LNFS (1 pick-up,1 command vehicles, 1 bus, 1 mini-bus, 1 4x4 Jeep)	MoF/Institutions	Jul 2015 - June 2016  By July 2016  Sep 2015- June 2016  June 2016  December 2015



BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	Prosecution (8 vehicles, 5 bus, 1 Ambulance ) Office of the Medical Examiner (3 vehicles, 2 ambulances) LiNCSA (6 motorbikes, 2 pickup trucks, 2 4x4 Jeep) MoJ (17 motorbikes, 1 4x4 Jeep, 1 high-top, 1 38 seat bus, 1 shuttle bus for prisoners)		December 2015 June 2015-Mar 2016 July-Sept 2015 July – Sep 2015 July – Sep 2016 April- June 2016
	<b>12.20 Acquire communications capability... (radios and mobile phones)</b> LNP (8 base radios, 105 mobile radios, 162 hand held radios, 64 cell phones) BIN (to support birder posts in 5 counties – specifics? ) BCR (8 base radios, 76 hand held radios, 60 cell phones) EPS (206 two-way radios) <b>LNFS (communication equipment for 6 sub-fire stations)</b>	MoF/Institutions	Jul 2015 - Jun 2016 Jul 2015 - Jun 2016 Jul 2015 - Jun 2016 January 2016 June 2016
	<b>12.21 Uniforms</b>	MoF/Institutions	Jul 2005 – Jun 2016

BENCHMARK		CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
		LNP (2000) BIN (508) DEA BCR (2000 prisoner uniforms) EPS		2016 Jul 2015 – June 2016 June 2016 August 2015 September 2015
		<b>12.22 Firearms and ammunition</b>  LNP (500 firearms / 656,500 ammunition) BIN (TBD firearms/TBD ammunition) DEA(TBD firearms/TBD ammunition) BCR (TBD firearms/TBD ammunition) EPS (400 firearms)	<b>MoF/Institutions</b>  MoJ MoJ MoJ MoJ EPS	Jul 2015 - June 2016 Jul 2015 - June 2016 Jul 2015 - June 2016 Jul 2015 - June 2016 Jul 2015 - June 2016 December 2015
		<b>12.23 Non-lethal materials</b>  LNP BIN	LNP BIN	June 2016 August 2015

BENCHMARK	CONSOLIDATED ACTIVITIES	LEAD	TIMELINE
	BCR TBD	BCR	TBD

Institutions	Training	Infrastructure	Per. Welfare	Communication et al	Uniform	Fire arm & Ammo	Logistics	Legal/systems	Total
LNP	9,852,381.50	7,654,000.00	1,206,900.00	3,468,900.00	8,838,900.00	1,913,000.00	11,958,200.00	11,124.00	44,903,405.50
BIN	2,129,233.30	2,085,000.00	3,750,000.00	511,675.00	606,400.00	3,948,415.00	735,450.00	355,000.00	14,121,173.30
EPS	802,718.06	292,945.00	-	330,242.00	294,564.00	680,000.00	521,400.00	11,375.00	2,933,244.06
MOD/AFL	2,025,200.00	4,300,000.00	-	3,000,000.00	-	-	-	300,000.00	9,625,200.00
DEA	815,400.00	300,000.00	645,000.00	175,000.00	-	-	1,198,092.00	400,000.00	3,533,492.00
LNFS	207,510.00	456,000.00	58,000.00	461,555.00	210,000.00	-	2,510,844.00	18,000.00	3,921,909.00
NSCS	724,562.00	-	541,800.00	97,948.00	-	-	196,000.00	40,700.00	1,601,010.00
NSA	19,980.00	560,000.00	-	-	-	-	556,000.00	210,125.00	1,346,105.00
BCR	860,400.00	5,811,398.00	11,110.00	115,500.00	-	-	365,000.00	407,320.00	7,570,728.00
LINCSA	353,250.00	264,000.00	-	-	-	-	350,000.00	905,000.00	1,872,250.00
MICAT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	69,100.00	69,100.00
Prosecution	162,460.80	170,000.00	2,157,500.00	530,000.00	-	-	450,000.00	86,000.00	3,555,960.80
MIA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,499,999.99	2,499,999.99
MoJ	91,912.00	200,000.00	8,000.00	34,425.00	-	-	383,451.00	781,450.00	1,499,238.00
Judiciary	1,957,800.00	526,286.80	1,350,000.00	246,000.00	-	-	747,840.00	968,136.00	5,796,062.80
<b>Total</b>	<b>20,002,807.66</b>	<b>22,619,629.80</b>	<b>9,728,310.00</b>	<b>8,971,245.00</b>	<b>9,949,864.00</b>	<b>6,541,415.00</b>	<b>19,972,277.00</b>	<b>7,063,329.99</b>	<b>104,848,878.45</b>